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CAPITAL, LABOUR AND THE S.A. STATE: 1939 - 1952
Kevin Davie
This paper is essentially a summary of part of a dissertation I am
preparing for a M. Soc. Science degree. The primary focus is on the
labour movement in South Africa during the forties, but as is shown
below, to understand the fortunes of labour one has to also evaluate
the role of Capital and the State. My initial reason for choosing to
investigate the 1940 - 1950 period was that the state during these
years was prepared to offer a measure of statutory recognition to
African unions. Another consideration was that there was a good deal
of labour unrest in the mid-forties. The struggle between Capital and
Labour intensified during these years, the like of which had not been
seen since the early 1920's. For these and other reasons the 1940's must
be an important period to investigate, yet little work has been completed
to date. This acted as an additional stimulus to me.
The research for the study was conducted at the South African Library in
Cape Town and to a lesser extent in the Special Collections Department
of the library at the University of Cape Town. Most of the research
material was of a primary nature.
A word about the theoretical position adopted in this study. In
general the approach is heavily influenced by the work of Nicos Poulantzas,
and the application of his theoretical writings to the South African sit-
uation by authors such as Kaplan, Davies and Morris. This is an approach
that has argued that capital should not be seen as a homogen ous class.
There are fractions within this class that struggle with one another for
supremacy in the power bloc. The dominant fraction, the one that is
able to present its interests as these of the social formation as a
whole, is the hegemonic fraction. This is not t^argue that the various
fractions within the power bloc are always in conflict with one another.
Fractions are identified in terms of their relationship to the means of
production i.e. on an economic level. But, they can only by fully ob-
served on the political leveX, where fractions may come to operate as an
autonomous social force, relatively independant of other fractions of
capital. This may happen when their interests are threatened by other
fractions of capital. The implication of this second aspect of the
manner in which fractions may be identified is that they can only be
seen in special historical periods.
An example may illustrate the above argument. Writers such as Kaplan
and Davies have argued that the fraction of national capital ac Heved
hegemony in the early 1920's. Economically this fraction may be identified
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by the fact, that this is a class fraction whose interests lie in.fostering
South African capitalist development. Within this fraction two other
fractions exist. There is the fraction of manufacturing capital and
agricultural capital, whose interests are in developing capitalist pro-
duction in town and country respectively. Since the complementary in-
terests of these two fractions out-weigh their contradictory interests,
they can and do work well together as an alliance of national capital,
i.e.: They work as an alliance, rather than as autonomous social forces.
This continued with 1939 when the outbreak of the Second World War broke
up this alliance.
Davies et al (1977) have argued that the declaration of war by Britain in
1939 disorganized the power bloc in the S.A. social formation. Manufacturing
capital supported S.African involvement in the war while agricultural
capital was in favour of a policy of neutrality. This was because man-
ufacturing argued that war time production would stimulate economic growth
in S.A. while Agriculture argued that it was a foreign and imperialist
war which would disrupt the S.A. economy and agricultural production.
The former allies split on the issue of S. African involvement in the
war. This is a first point to emphasize, the decision to go to war dis-
organized the power bloc, and ended the hegemony of national capital.
A second point, elaborated upon below is that war-time production further
intensified the contradictions between these two fractions of capital
While before the war they were able to operate effectively as allies,
after the war they could only behave as autonomous and independent
fractions, struggling for hegemony in a disorganized power bloc.
The effect of war-time production on the different fractions of capital
and labour is considered in more detail below.
Manufacturing Capital
I have mentioned that Manufacturing capital supported S. African involve-
ment in the Second World War. Davies et al (1977) hold that this fraction
of capital managed to maintain a tenuous hegemony during the war. This
was possible because its interests corresponded most closely with those
of the war effort and because it enjoyed the support of minina capital
and fractions of labour. The first of these two points is more or less
obvious. The hegemonic fraction is the one that can best present its
interests as those of the social formation as a whole. The success of
the S. African contribution to the war lay in increasing production
of munitions and supplies, which was primarily undertaken by the manu-
facturing sector. This brings us to the second point. Manufacturing
capital was able to maintain its hegemonic position during the war be-
cause of a prevalence of what could be called an ideological unity. A
number of different ideological positions were incorporated in the
'fight against fascism1. A major concern was that no action should be
taken which may harm the war effort. An example of this was the res-
trictive strike policy adopted by labour.during the war. Even the
left-wing labour leaders supported this policy.
Manufacturing capital was able to maintain a position of dominance within
the power bloc because of the peculiar conditions introduced by war-time
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production. These were years of rapid growth for manufacturing, gross out-
put increasing by 116% between 1938 and 1944/5, from R281 M to R608 M
(Houghton, 1969:119).Under conditions of war-time production manufacturing
industry flourished. At the same time the numbers of worker employed in
manufacturing almost doubled itself. This is shown in table 1. Black
male workers in manufacturing increased by over 200,000 between 1936 and
1946.
1921
1936
1946
1951
WHITE
MALE
34,748
62,991
98,942
143,000
FEMALE
8,791
27,590
32,595
39,630
BLACK
MALE
203,776
272,641
488,667
590,929
FEMALE
15,814
3,372
8,294
10,243
TABLE 1: Male and Female workers in manufacturing industry during census
years.
Source Union Statistics for 50 years.
The increase in the rate of urbanisation during the war was primarily
motivated by the higher wages paid to workers by secondary industry. The
process was facilitated by the state, which relaxed the application of
the pass laws. Even though the rate of urbanisation had increased drama-
tically during the war, the number of convictions for pass law offences
decreased, as in reflected in the official data. (Table 2).
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
183,829
169,945
120,126
115,527
124,980
137,177
-
173,718
176,129
217,538
217,387
TABLE 2: Crime and Offences: African Control
Source: Union Statistics for 50 years.
We see the number of Africans convicted of paw law offences declined by
nearly 50,000 per year between 1940 and 1945 despite an increase in the
movement to the towns. The fact that this provoked the hostility of
agriculture shows that the state was favouring the interests of manufacturing
capital and neglecting agriculture. It was only after pressure from the
SAAU in 1946 that the pass laws were more stringently applied. This is
also reflected in the data above.
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At the cessation of hostilities the mood of industry appears to have been
pessimistic. This was a result of anticipated problems in transforming
from a military to a civilian economy. Some of these problems were
mentioned by the president of the S.A.Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI),
Y.E. Williams in 1946. He said that there were shortages of goods of
every description, that the country was burdened by unproductive controls,
men and women had to be absorbed into industry and civilian life, and a
large number of civilians who were engaged in the production of munitions,
had to find new occupations.S.A.F.C.1. Annual Report, 1946).. But my im-
pression is that these concerns were of a peripheral nature. The central
issue confronting manufacturing industry during the mid-forties was that
of industrial unrest amongst African workers. Strike activity on the
part of African had increased during the war. Table 3 shows the extent
of the increase in the number of African workers on strike.
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1,568
4,849
3,706
4,839
7 30
4,765
12,794
7,370
12,041
14,694
84,035
TABLE 3:
Source
Black workers on strike, 1936 - 1946
Union Statistics for 50 years
Industry was perturbed by the increase in strike activity, and aghast at
the size of the African union movement which had developed in the late
1930's and early 1940's. By 1945 the Transvaal Council of Non-European
Trade Unions claimed 158,000 members. Clearly manufacturing saw a
need to regulate and control these organisations, which were a potential
threat to production. Organized industry responded to the growth of
African unions by calling on the state to deal with these unions by
recognizing and controlling them. During the 1940's manufacturing
capital repeatedly called for the state to control organisations and
establish them on a 'sound' basis. The 1945 FCI Convention resolved:
"That this Convention is greatly concerned at the continued
development of Native trade union's in South Africa, free
from any form of control or recognition by the Government.
That this Convention votes with satisfaction that the Prime
Minister is considering official recognition of Native trade
unions, and trusts that this principle will be implemented
by early legislative action". (SAFCI Annual Report, 1945)
The following year (1946) the FCI formally expressed its disappointment
over the delay in passing legislation to recognize African unions. (SAFCI,
Annual Report, 1976). Other employer organisations which strongly advocated
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the recognition of these unions included Durban Chamber of Commerce, the
Natal Chamber of Industries and the Transvaal Chamber of Industries (TCI).
The 1848 convention of the TCI reported that
"The haphazard drift of Native workers under conditions where
they become fertile subjects for indoctrination by pernicious
philosophies must be halted. This object can only be achieved
by a) legal recognition of Native unions b) their rigid
control and c) methodical tuition and futelage of such organ-
isations." (Industrial Review, Official Organ of the TCI,
December 1949:22)
Industry saw the existing African trade union movement as a threat. African
unions perse were not feared*, it was the thought of uncontrolled and un-
regualted organisations that perturbed industry. Orderly unions offered
the possibility of industrial peace. This was the main reason that em-
ployer's organisations demanded statutory recognition for African unions
in the post-war years. But there were other reasons as well, if less
important. For example, many spokesmen argued that for industry to ad-
just to civilian production, levels of demand for its products would have
to be maintained. One way to do this, as was often pointed out, was to
increase the buying power of the South African Blacks. An example of this
sort of attitude was the report in "Industry and Trade" of the views of
R. Bernum, a prominent Port Elizabeth industrialist. He said that if the
organisation of Africans into proper unions led to higher wages, so much
the better. The national income or purchasing power was nothing more than
the national wage bill. Higher wages would mean an increased market for
South African goods. ("The Guardian" October:1947) .
But while organized industry favoured statutory recognition of African
unions there was disagreement on what form this should take. The TCI
argued that separate legislation should be pro ided for African unions.
They were against affording recognition under the Industrial Conciliation
Act because Africans "were still emerging from a primitive existence"
(Ind. Review, 1949 December:22). The FCI, on the other hand, could not
agree on the form recognition should take. For example, at the 1947 con-
vention only one speaker gave any attention to the Industrial Condiliation
(Natives) Bill, even though the Bill was of considerable importance to
manufacturing industry. He said:
"Lack of discussion by Convention of (ttee IC Natives Bill) may
be explained by the known cleavage of opinion on the conditions
under which Natives should be allowed to form trade unions.
Perhaps Convention was right in deciding that this difficult
and contentious matter was left to the proposed commission of
enquiry on industrial legislation" (SA Industry & Trade Review,
1947: 0ctober:39).
But although industrialists did not agree on the form of trade union re-
cognition which should be conceded to African unions, the majority saw
this as the most urgent and pressing problem facing manufacturing industry.
This was the view of industry in the raid-forties.
After 1947 industry began to change its position with regard to African
trade union recognition. While policy statements, journals, magazines and
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annual reports of industry up to 1947 contain vigorous demands for African
Union rights, between 1947 and 1950 these demands appear less frequently
and show that industry was no longer united on the issue. By 1950 the
chief concern of manufacturing industry was
 n ot trade union rights for
African workers, but what was referred to as the 'Native in industry1.
This was the question of labour allocation between town and country
through influx control.
After 1950 manufacturing capital no longer campainged for statutory
recognition of African unions. It had turned its attention to ensuring
that its labour needs would be met.
I would argue that this was a primary reason for the failure of the
African union movement in the 'forties' to win recognition. Without the
support of this fraction of capital, the goal of re-definition of the
category of "employees" under the IC Act was unattainable. The reasons
for the shift on the part of manufacturing on this issue are considered
in detail below. The primary reason for the state altering its strategy
with regard to the potential threat of African unions is that a change
in the form of state had taken place. Manufacturing capital lost the
c . tenuous hegemony it had enjoyed during the war. In the post-war period
the state took greater cognizance of the interests of agriculture. This
was primarily a result of an organized offensive by agriculture and the
fact that this fraction of capital was able to attract a number of supportive
parties to better its position in the social formation. Whereas the state
had emphasized manufacturing and urban interests during the war, after
the war and increasingly after 1950, agriculture came into its own.
The Conflict between Manufacturing and Agricultural Capital. T n e arita~
gonism and struggle for state power that took place between agriculture
and manufacturing duirng the 'forties was particularly significant within
the social formation. The conflict was also interesting considering the
fact that these 2 fractions of capital had worked together as an alliance
between 1924 and 1939'.
While agriculture did not support S. African involvement in the war (See
Davies, et al: 1977), it benefitted from the war-time economy. This was
because the demand for agricultural produce increased dramatically during
the war. Producer's prices rose by about 60% between 1938 and 1945
'( - (Finlay, 1976:63). But even though the fortunes of agriculture had been
improved by the transition to a military economy, this fraction of capital
saw much room for improvement. There were two crucial areas of
complaint, the application of the Marketing Act of 1937 and the allocation
of labour between rural and urban areas. Price fixing through the control
boards kept agricultural prices relatively stable and low even though
both internal and international demand improved. In its marketing strategy
the state was seen to be "compelling the farmer to carrv the rest of the
population on his back." (Primary Producer 3 October, 1947).
The same journal accused the Government of "sacrificing agriculture on
the altar of national interest in an attempt to reduce the cost of living,
since the Government was starting with the prices of agricultural products
and hoping that, if these are scaled down sufficiently, other prices will
follow". ("Primary Producer 23 April, 1947")
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The second issue, the question of labour allocation had arisen during the
1930's, and became acute for agriculture during the 1940's. Thousands of
African workers withdrew their labour from agriculture to sell to manu-
facturing. By 1939 the Institute of Race Relations reported that migrant
labour was no longer being drawn from the Reserves, and that "the farms
are now becoming what the Reserves used to be, sources of labour supply"
(Morris, 1977:5).
When agricultural production began to expand during the war the farm labour
shortage reached crisis proportions. On many occasions agriculture
called on the state to solve the problem by controlling the movement of
Africans into the urban areas. The response of the state was that the
shortage could be overcome by improving the level of wages and working
conditions of the farms. But this was unacceptable to farmers, as is
seen. From an editorial in "the Farmers Weekly (31 May, 1939) summing up their
attitude to these proposals.
"The question (is) ... how higher wages are to be paid by an
industry that is so inadequately and insufficiently recompensed
for the products from which the wage and every other cost has
to be met ... While all these suggestions (for better conditions)
are admirable in theory and would no doubt be effective in
practise, the sum of their cost in application will to the
minds of most farmers, not solve the question of ways and
means- of finding the ready cash, which in these days is the
acutest of all the problems which the farmer is called unon
to solve". (Morris, 1977:13)
By 1944 agriculture had worked out a strategy whereby the farm labour
shortage could be alleviated. This consisted of a number of concrete
proposals, including the co-ordination of passes then in existence, the
establishment of labour bureaux to control the movement of Africans be-
tween urban and rural area, and a system of registration which would
'establish the identity, place of employment and domicile of every
African1 (Morris, 1977:15). But at this time the state still favoured
urban interests. The minister of Native Affairs, responded to the above
proposals by telling the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) that
the African had a right to sell his labour where he received the best price
In the post-war period agriculture organized itself into an offensive, to
force the state to realize its interests. In 1945 the SAAU held a con-
ference with the stated aim of building up the pd"wer and organisation of
agricultural capital. The following year all farmer's co-operatives merged
with the SAAU, forming the United Front, a single national body to co-
ordinate and look after the interests of agriculture.
The establishment of a United Front undoubtedly increased the power of
agriculture in the social formation. But agriculture was still not
sufficiently powerful to motivate the state to act as it desired. The
power bloc was severely disorganized in the mid-1940's. The state was
unable to act decisively in the interest of any fraction of capital, be-
cause it was unable to reconcile the contradictory interests of these
fractions of capital. So while manufacturing campaigned for the recognition
of African unions, agriculture was not prepared to support this. It would
not approve any strategy which would potentially lead to a deterioration of
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an already critical situation. It was widely anticipated that unionisation
of Africans would lead to wage increases. The "high" rates of pay earned
in the urban areas motivated African workers to leave the farms and sell
their labour-power to manufacturing industry. Agriculture did not and
would not support any legislation which would be likely to develop in-
stitutions for Africans in the urban areas. Some spokesmen for agriculture
had even urged the repeal of the few existing measures that did provide
social security benefits for African workers. For example, J.M. Fouche
speaking in parliament said that the Factories Act and the Unemployment
Insurance Act all aggravated the farm labour shortage because this legislation
made provision for higher wages, shorter working hours, fixed holidays
and the payment of overtime and unemployment insurance. (Hansard, 1948;
Col 1615).
Before considering the outcome of the struggle between the two fractions
of capital, it is important to discuss raining capital.
Mining Capital
Mining had supported South African involvement in the Second World War.
But while the war had been of benefit to manufacturing and to a lesser
extent, agriculture, it had disastrous consequences for mining. This was
because the price of gold was set for the duration of the war, while
working costs escalated dramatically from 19s 5d per ton in 1939 to
25s 6d per ton in 1945 (SA Mining and Year Book, 1947/8). As internal
costs rocketed in South Africa during the war so did the costs of production
within the mining industry. The Transvaal Chamber of Mines (TCM) often
stressed to point that they were unable to pass increases in working
costs onto the consumer. This meant that mining profits deceased, and that
many low grade mines became marginally operative some even being forced
to close down. By 1947 working profit was R42,800,000 less than half of
the R90,000,000 it had been in 1941 (TCM Annual Reports). In the same
period state revenue from mining taxation dropped from R54,000,000 to
R25,6000,000 (TCM Annual Report, 1947:60). This decrease in revenue
earned potentially effected manufacturing and agriculture go well, since
the various protective subsidies which the state made available to these
two fractions were possible through the imposition of taxes on the gold
mining industry (See Kaplan, 1976),
Mining capital regarded itself as being in a state of crisis during the mid-
19401 s. But the increase in working costs was tie*" the only factor which
had contributed to the crisis. Two other factors should be mentioned;
the imposition of special taxes during the war and the"labour shortages the
industry experienced. Special taxes to finance the war effort were imposed
on the industry in 1940. In 1942/3 42% of total net mining income and 69%
of declared working profit were paid to the state in some form of tax
(Davies, et al, 1977:22). Expressed in terms of state revenue mining
taxation rose from R19,211,198 (21,79% of total revenue earned) in 1938/9
to R110,348,494 (46,6% of total revenue) in 1944/5. (Union of SA Official
Yearbooks, 1940 and 1948). The other factor which contributed to the
adverse circumstances mining was to endure during the 1940's was a labour
shortage, particularly of African workers. A feature of the mining industry
is that as much gold as is produced will be bought. For this reason
mining capital is always keen to have a full complement of workers. During
the 1940's however, the members employed on the mines fell as is shown in
Table 4:
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1942 •
1943
1944
1945 .....
1946
1947
1948
1949 .....
1950 .....
WHITE
49,000
47,000
45,000
43,000
43,000
41,000
41,000
42,000
56,000
AFRICAN
386,000
333,000
322,000
311,000
328,000
319,000
300,000
315,000
329,000
TABLE 4: White and African males on Gold Mines,
1942-50 (Correct to nearest 1,000)
Source: Union Statistics for 50 Years
( • •
Note that the numbers of White and African miners reduced by 8,000 and
86,000 respectively between 1942 and 1948. The TCM claimed that the
cause of this was that manufacturing industry paid more attractive wages.
This applied particularly to African miners - mining claimed in 1943 that
its labour force was just 84% of its total requirements. (Davies, et al.
1977:22). It is worthwhile to point out that even if mining had been
able and prepared to increase African wages, this would not have automatically
solved the labour shortage. The president of the TCM, SA Unger noted
this, saying:
"The Industry's Native labour force is composed of
almost entirely of migratory workers who come to
the mines for limited periods and return home for
long spells of rest and idleness ... With the ex-
pansion in secondary industries, the demand that
must be met from existing sources of migratory
labour has greatly increased. This activity has
created a considerable increase in the free flow of
money amongst the Natives, the effect of which is
to enable the migrant Native to work less frequently
and to enjoy still longer periods of leisure.
(TCM 58th Report, 1947:63)
By 1945 the mining industry was in a state of crisis. Dividends declared
in this year were R26,718,000, lower than what they were in 1933.
The Struggle for Hegemony within the State
So far the effect of the war on capital and the structure of hegemony has
been discussed. Manufacturing capital was able to achieve hegemony
during the war because it enjoyed the support of mining and fractions of
labour. But,in the post-war period this fraction of capital found it
increasingly difficult to present its interests as primary. It also lost
the support of mining capital, the latter working independantly in an
effort to get the state to solve the pressing problems it was jacing.
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The above discussion should have also shown that the 3 principal fractions
of capital had peculiar problems to deal with. The solution to the
problems faced by one fraction would have been likely to worsen the position
of the others. The state found itself being urged to act in numerous and
contradictory ways. The power bloc was disorganized and the state unable
to serve the interests of any single fraction of capital. In this fluid
situation the 3 fractions struggled to present their interests as primary.
The outcome of the struggle between agriculture and manufacturing capital
was that agriculture was able to improve its position at the expense of
the latter. It achieved this through the establishment of the United
Front and, more significantly through being able to enlist the support of
Africaner industrial capital and sections of the labour aristocracy. A
proportion of the labour aristocracy withdrew their support from manufacturing
capital and allied to agricultural and Africaner capital. Economic rather
than ideological reasons were responsible for this switch of allegiance,
and were centred around the mining industry. have seen above that
mining capital was in a crisis. At the same time wages in this industry
had fallen behind the rapidly rising cost of living. As early as 1941
white miners had demanded pay increases of 30%. The TCM were not prepared
to concede these demands, and instead struck an agreement with the leader-
ship of the Mine Worker's Union (MWU). During the war the latter controlled
and disciplined the rank-and-file, rather than trying to win wage increases
for the union membership. The result was the series of strikes in 1948
and 1947. The United Party consistently sided with mining capital in
the dispute in order to check rising costs in the industry. Similarly,
the labour Party supported the corrupt leadership of the MWU. On the
other hand the National Party Championed the cause of the white miner,
their 1948 election platform including a 30% pay increase for miners and
nationalisation of the gold mines. It was in this context that significant
sections of the labour aristocracy withdrew their support from manufacturing
capital and its political party representative,the United Party, to
support agricultural capital and the National Party.
The support of sections of the labour aristocracy proved crucial in the
struggle between manufacturing and agriculture. The latter had improved
its position to the extent that the state took greater cogniyance of its
interests. The 1945 SAAU proposals were put into legislative form in the
Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act (1952), the Prevention
of Illegal Squatting (1951), the Native Town Annnendment Act (1952), the
Urban Areas Ammendment Act (1952), the Native Labour Regulation Ammendment
Act (1949) and the Population Registration Act (>952). Morris (1977: 35-44)
too discusses this legislation in some depth. These Acts all contained
clauses aimed at alleviating the farm labour shortage through efflux and
influx control. A system of labour bureaux was established to re-distribute
labour between town and country.
Whereas the state during the war and in the immediate post-war period had
favoured manufacturing where conflicts of interests existed between this
fraction and agriculture, by 1948 the balance of power had begun to swing
in the latter's favour. In the late 1940's and early 1950's manufacturing
was forced to act defensively to protect its interests. It no longer cam-
paigned for the recognition of African unions; the central concern for this
fraction of capital had become the protection of labour supplies. I want
to consider this first issue in more detail before discussing the second.
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After the demise of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in
the late 1920's, the remaining African unions with one exception, all
disappeared during the depression years. (1929 - 1933).Trade Union re-
organisation and growth during the 193O's had much to do with the work of
Max Gordon. By 1937 he was secretary of 4 unions, and helped form the
Joint Committee in 1939. By 1940 this committee claimed 26,000 - 27,000
members. It was at this stage that the African trade unions attracted
the attention of the state. By 1939 the Departments of Native Affairs
and Labour argued that the rapid growth and development of 'Native trade
unions' and particularly the intervention of 'leftist' agitators and
organisers had made it appropriate to start organizing African unions.
Their position was these unions should be given informal and administrative
recognition by the state.
The Departments of Labour and Native Affairs then drew up a series of
rules for African unions. In August, 1939 the minister of labour discussed
these rules with African trade unionists, who objected to the fact that
the rules required them to negotiate through the Department of Native
Affairs. Negotiations broke down at this stage. In June 1941 a new set
of rules were designed, which were presented to the newly-formed Council
of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) in October, 1943. CNETU had been
formed in 1942 with the aim of including African workers under the scope
of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1937. Since the administrative
recognition that the state was prepared to offer was less than this CNETU
turned down the offer.
Meanwhile CNETU continued to grow in size and influence. By 1945 it was
at its largest and at this stage the African union movement was perceived
as a great threat to peace and order in South Africa. This is not to say
that there is a 100% correlation between size of trade unions and the
potential threat they hold. Other factors would be important to explain
this. So we may speculate that even if CNETU had a similar membership in
the early 1950's the central and gravest concern could still have
been the question of labour allocation.
Nonetheless, by 1945 the demands for recognition of African unions from
manufacturing capital African unionists, the South African Trades and
Labour Council (SATLC) and others, had reached a peak. The SATLC told
Smuts that recognition of African unions could not be put off much longer,
because African unions had become a force that could no longer be ignored.
The state responded to these demands by announcing that it was prepared
to afford statutory recognition to African unions. The Secretary for
Labour, Ivan Walker said in October 1945 that legislation was being drawn
up to recognise African unions, all unregistered unions would be illegal
strikes were to be illegal in1 all circumstances, union officials would be
elected under government supervision and approval, and that there would
be compulsory arbitration by mediation boards to settle disputes. (The
Guardian" November, 1945). These principles were all contained in the
Industrial Conciliation (Natives) Bill of 1947 which was the way the
UP state hoped to deal with the African trade union movement. This Bill
was published in March, 1947, following a period of inaction on the part
of the state. "The Guardian" had reported that the state had decided to
shelve the Walker pronosals, but then the August, 1946 African mineworker's
strike took place. An African union, the AMWU had played a prominent role
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in organizing this strike, and CNETU had called a general strike of all African
workers in support of the miners. While this general strike did not mat-
erialize, these events made the state realize the power of the African
union movement. Early in 1947 Smuts announced that it was proposed to in-
troduce into parliament a "Native trade Union Bill" to prohibit strikes,
control trade unions of African workers, and make permanent the exclusion
of African workers from the IC Act. (Inkul leko, Second Issue May, 1947)
This Bill seems to reflect the weak position the state found itself in at
this time. Very few parties accepted this proposed legislation, it was
rejected outright by both fractions of capital and labour. The only group
which seemed to accept the Bill was the TCI. A few years later the
Minister of Labour, Ben Schoeman summed up the response to the Bill:
"The previous Government in 1947 published a Bill in
which provision was made for the recognition of
Native trade unions and a limited form of collective
bargaining, but the Bill was acceptable to nobody.
The Natives did not want it, the trade unions did
not want it, the Native representatives were opposed
to it, and conservative opinion in the country was also
opposed to it, in other words, nobody wanted it; it
satisfied nobody". (Hansard, 1953 Col 872).
The Industrial Conciliation (Natives) Bill had been published in March, 1947.
By October, 1947 Minister of Labour Colin Steyn had announced that he was
considering scrapping or at least revising the IC (Natives) Bill. The
Bill was not introduced into parliament by the Party in 1948, and when
the National Party/Afrikaner Party came to power in June/July, 1948, they
"bought time" by announcing in September that there would be no new
legislation on African unions until 1950. Meanwhile War Measure No. 145
of 1942 would apply. To further give the state time to manouevre, Schoeman
appointed the Industrial Legislation Commission in October, 1948.
The ILC presented its report in 1951. As is well-known, it recommended that
African unions were recognised in a manner similar to that envisaged by the
IC (Natives) Bill. The state rejected this finding of the commision, how-
ever, and instead presented the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes)
Bill to parliament. Ben Schoeman, the Minister of Labour gave the following
reasons for being unable to accept the recommendations of the commission
in this regard:-
"The Native trade union movement is not a spontaneous
movement amongst Native workers. The Native unions that
are in existence to-day came into an existence mainly
as a result of efforts made by certain European
trade unionists and left-wing agitators".
"It must be realized that directly official recognition
is extended to Native trade unions it will act as an
incentive ... and you will probably have a large and
not very sound Native trade union movement in South Africa".
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"What we must bear in mind is that these trade unions
can be used as a political weapon ... We have seen
during the past year that the Natives, when they do
organize themselves into trade unions, use them as
political weapons to further their political aims".
(Hansard, 1953, Col 867)
The UP state and NP state differed in their strategy to control African
unions. The former was prepared to 'incorporate' these unions and rid
them of 'leftist' leaders establishing the unions on a 'sound' and
controlled basis. The latter used legislation like the Suppression of
Communism Act of 1950 to attack and remove the leadership of the African
trade union movement. While both the UP state's Industrial Conciliation
(Natives) Bill and the NP state's Suppression of Communism Act were aimed
at the leadership of the movement, the former was an attempt at incorporation
the latter repression.
Hepple (195:59) has said that the application of the Suppression of Communism
Act proves that its chief objective was to purge the trade unions. By
18th September, 1953, 33 trade union officials had been ordered to resign
their positions. (Hansard 1953, Col 237). By 1956, 75 officials had been
listed, and of these 56 had been forced to resign their positions (Horrell,
195: ). Data is not available on how many of these unionists were in-
volved with African unions, but in this Act the NP state found an effective
way of challenging any potential threat from the African trade unions.
This is most clearly seen in the way this Act was used a few years later
to remove the entire leadership of the South African Congress of Trade
Unions (SACTU).
Whereas the SA state up to 1947 was prepared to recognize African unions,
but unsure on what form this should take, by the early 'Fifties' its
position had changed to where it attacked the leadership of these unions
in the hope that they would die a "natural death". I have argued that
the primary season for this must be seen to be the change in the form of
state that took place during these years. The balance of power within the
state after 1950 demanded a different course of action to that proposed in
the 'forties ' .
Further, I would argue that it is difficult to determine whether the African
union movement was stronger or weaker in the early 'fifties' than it had
been in the mid-forties. While comparison of derived membership of these
unions shows that you were weaker in the early 'fifties, in other respects
they posed a greater threat to the dominant classes: For example, after
1947 many union leaders began to reject the notion conducting the struggle
on an economic level only. This had been the position of CNETU up to 1947
(campaigning for the recognition of African unions under the IC Act), but
after this most African unions allied themselves to political movements
like the Defence Campaign. In many respects African working class organ-
isations posed greated threat after 1948, even if trade union membership
decreased.
Capital and the NP state.
In this final section I want to discuss capital in SA in the late 1940's
and early 1950's in more detail. The declining fortunes of manufacturing
industry within the social formation can be clearly seen in its relation
- 14 -
to the NP state and change in government in 1948. It is clear that the
victory of the NP in 1948 perturbed industry. The SA Industry and Trade
Review commented:-
"We do not believe that any government will ride
roughshod over the interests of business in pursuit
of electioneering balloons ... (Business) will not
preiudge (the new Government) on platform propaganda
at the elections, nor on destructive criticism from
the other side of the House. It will calmly await the
development of Government policy. It will support the
Government as long as that policy is fair and just to
business and it will not hesitate to use its, powerful
influence against any group of politicians who may try
unfairly to discriminate against business". (1948, June: )
The issue that made industry concerned was that the 'apartheid'policy of
the NP would undermine the supply of labour available to industry. "FCI
News" reported that the Government had said that if industrialisation meant
that the White urban population would be engulfed by Africans, then they
'(• were not prepared to go on with it. Industry objected to this because it
meant that primary industry (mining and agriculture) would be placed in a
more competitive position with regard to the available supply of labour.
(FCI News, September, 1948: ).
Industry began to agitate for a meeting with representatives of the state
to discuss the apartheid policy. This took place during 1951. At this
meeting state policy was explained to leaders of organized industry.
Ben Schoeman, the Minister of Labour argued that the policy was an ideal,
which would take many years to achieve, and
"We have never advocated total apartheid - we accept the
position that there will be a permanent native population
in the urban areas. We have no intention to withdraw
native labour from secondary industry". ("The manufacturer,
August, 1951: )
Another early official statement came from Eiselin, the Secretary for Native
Affairs. He said that the country's present use of manpower was wasteful,
/•' ' inefficient and very expensive. But, he also stressed that unlike the
:
 'official1 reports like the Stallard Commission (UG ) , he believed
that the urban African population was permanent. '•The reality was that there
was an excessive supply of manpower in the urban areas and a depletion
in other areas. ("The Manufacturer" 1950, October: ) .
So the NP state intervened to solve the labour Crisis for agriculture. A
range of legislation was enacted (listed above) which was directed at the
size of the surplus of African labour in the cities. It did not take labour
away from industry, but rather ensured that the size of the reserve army
in the urban areas was strictly controlled. Verwoed, as Minister of Native
Affairs, spelt this out in parliament.
"My administration will naturally see to it that there
would be a certain plussage. It is quite impossible to
determine exactly the labour need and the labour available .
In the ordinary course of circumstances there will be a
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certain small margin of available labour but it must be
expected that the plussage cannot be large ... It is a
matter of where you stop providing surplus labour ...
When we take into consideration the fact that the instru-
ment dealing with this provision will be the local author-
ity and that the local authority has sufficient interest
in the development of industry in its own area and the
prosperity of its industries, we can take it that it
won't cut down the possibility of obtaining employees in
such a way that industry would suffer. Indsutry is there-
for in very good hands indeed." (Hansard, 1952: Col 1315).
By 1950 manufacturing industry had been forced to act defensively as
agriculture made demands on its labour supplies. The actions of the NP
state ensured adequate numbers of agricultural workers for the latter, and
also slowed the rate of urbanisation. But, while agriculture had improved
its bargaining position in the social formation, it did not enjoy hegemony.
It had not succeeded in presenting its interests as those of the social
formation as a whole, nor did it assume the organizing role within the
power bloc. The latter remained disorganized during the 1950fs.
Before concluding this section one final point needs to be made. I have
shown that an important contributory factor to the crisis capital experienced
in the mid-'forties', was the state of the mining industry. The UP state
was unable to alleviate conditions in this industry, but did its best to
keep wages from rising. The National Party had come to power on a platform
which included a 30% pay increase and nationalisation of the gold mines.
This had enabled them to win many worker votes away from the Labour
Party. After being in office for a year the NP had given up the idea of
nationalizing the mines, and had been unable to secure wage increases for
miners.
In April, 1949 the MWU leadership declared their intention of forming a new
political party called "The Worker's Party" because of the failure of the
NP to meet their demands. They intended contesting a bye-election against
a NP candidate. But this party was never formed because after devaluation,
in 1949 the price of gold rose by 40%. The TCM responded to this by in-
creasing wages by 15% and working conditions in the industry. This rise
in the price of gold effectively ended the crisis mining had experienced
during the 1940's. Dividends declared by the industry in 1950 were an
all-time record of R52,942,000. ^ .
It was the adverse state of the mining industry that had led significant
sections of the labour aristocracy to switch allegiance from the United
Party and Labour Party to the^National Party. When the latter failed to
"deliver the goods "as promised, these workers declared their intention of
forming their own political party. Fortunately for the NP the crisis
solved itself through the rise in the price of gold.
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